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IATA: ITS LEGAL STRUCTURE - A CRITICAL REVIEWt
By WARREN W. KOFFLERtt
I. INTRODUCTION
A IR COMMERCE between nations is subject to economic regulation
by the International Air Transport Association.' IATA is an inter-
national trade association which is cartel-like in a number of its operations.
It is no more, or less, cartel-like by reason of the fact that it enjoys pro-
tective immunity from the municipal law of the several nations that have
sanctioned its existence and operation. There are divergent views as to
whether or not the accomplishments of this organization justify the con-
tinuation of its privileged status under the domestic law of the United
States.4
II. IATA AS AN INSTITUTION
The success of IATA was born out of the failure of the Chicago Con-
ference on International Aviation to arrive at a multilateral agreement
t The title of this article clearly states its nature. Professor John Cobb Cooper, a former Editor
and Editorial Advisor of the Journal (and former Legal Counsel of IATA) has expressed disagree-
ment with a number of the author's statements. The Journal neither advocates nor necessarily agrees
with the author's position. However, the Journal feels that the article is a useful, thought-provoking
work. Certain officials of IATA were offered the opportunity to publish a simultaneous reply but
declined because of conflicting schedules.
The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the viewpoint of the Journal's
Editors, Editorial Advisors, or Publisher.
tt LL.B., New York Univ. Former trial attorney, Federal Aviation Agency; currently in private
practice in Washington, D.C. Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars.
' "Most international fares and rates are generally arrived at by agreement among the carrier
members of the International Air Transport Association .. " 1964 CAB ANN. REP. 22.
' "It is said to be a monopoly when one person alone buys up the whole of one kind of com-
modity, fixing a price at his own pleasure," Case of Monopolies, 11 Coke 86 (1602). An association
of persons in the same business, who join together on an international basis to fix prices and meth-
ods of operation, is a cartel. WEBsTER NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (College ed. 1959). IATA is an
international monopoly, or cartel, by either classic or modern definition. While its stated purpose
is to create economic air transport, its actual operation has set prices at a level sufficient to support
the least efficient of its carrier members. It is simple to demonstrate, by example, that international
air fares would be lower, were they not subject to control by a cartel: The route between Miami
and Bogota provides a convenient example of an IATA rate, subsequent IATA v. non-IATA com-
petition, and a lower IATA rate. In 1962, only IATA carriers flew the route between Miami and
Bogota. At that time, Avianca, one of the IATA carriers flying the route, offered the IATA prop
excursion fare of $162 round trip. Official Airline Guide (World Wide Edition), Nov. 1962, p.
C-518. Subsequently, a foreign air carrier permit for this route was granted to Aerocondor (Aerovias
Condor de Columbia, Ltda.), a non-IATA carrier; Aerocondor offered the route at a prop round
trip excursion fare of $130. Official Airline Guide, Feb. 1965, p. C-497. IATA, faced with mean-
ingful competition, reduced its fare, as reflected by Avianca, to the same amount. Official Airline
Guide, Feb. 1965, p. 497. There is no reason to believe that IATA would have reduced its fare, but
for the non-IATA competition; there is good reason to believe that, but for IATA, international
air fares would be substantially lower. See Comment, CAB Regulation of International Transporta-
tion, 75 HARV. L. REv. 575, 579 (1962).
31ATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C.A.B. 639 (1946); See 40 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 112,
115 (1947); Cf., Brief for the Dep't of Justice, IATA Agency Resolutions Proceeding, 12 C.A.B.
493 (1951).
4 McManus v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961). IATA
has impliedly acknowledged the need for structural revision. Parrish, New Look For IATA: A
Cultured Swede, American Aviation, May 1965, pp. 18-19.
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concerning the economic regulation of international air commerce." This
conference, called by President Roosevelt in November 1944, was an
attempt to assure the orderly development of international aviation at
the conclusion of the hostilities! While fifty-four nations convened at
Chicago," two were clearly dominant: the United States with a great
aviation war machine ready for conversion to civilian operation, and Great
Britain with her vast chain of colonies. Two radically different plans were
offered:"
(1) The United States Plan-a United Nations type of organization to
control technical matter with no delegation of authority to any interna-
tional organization to fix rates, routes, frequencies, or capacity.
(2) The United Kingdom Plan-an international air authority to de-
termine and distribute frequencies and capacity and with authority to fix
rates; routes were to be agreed upon bilaterally.
It became clear at the outset of the meeting that a stalemate as to the
economic aspects of international air commerce was in the offing. In the
hope of establishing a basic format for future discussions, the airline
representatives, who were attending the conference as technical advisors
to the several official representatives, formed a committee to draft articles
of association for a new trade association of international air carriers.
At its conclusion, the Chicago Conference had achieved two lasting
accomplishments:
(1) conclusion of the Chicago Convention establishing ICA0 I for
standardization of international flight data; and
(2) agreement upon two elements of reciprocal privilege in international
air commerce;" i.e., innocent passage above a sovereignty, and landing
privileges for non-traffic purposes.
These two elements formed part of the "Five Freedoms"" of international
'Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 22, pt. 1 (Airlines) at 1072 [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Hearings]; ALEX-
ANDROWICZ, WORLD ECONOMIC AGENCIES LAW AND PRACTICE 153 (1962).
8 Ibid.
Jones, The Equation of Aviation Policy, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 227 (1960); See generally U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE (1946).
Ibid.
Antitrust Hearings 1072.
" SCHENKMAN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION passim (1955); H. SMITH,
AIRWAYS ABROAD 182-85 (1950).
11 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 Dec. 1944, pt. II, ch. VII, art. 43, 61 Stat.
1192 (1946).
I"International Air Services Transit Agreement, 7 Dec. 1944, art. 1, sec. 1, 59 Star. 1693
(1945).
" The Five Freedoms are:
(1) First Freedom:
Innocent passage above a sovereign state;
(2) Second Freedom:
Freedom to land for non-traffic purposes;
(3) Third Freedom:
Freedom of State A's airline to discharge citizens and property of State A in State B;
(4) Fourth Freedom:
Freedom of State A's airline to pick up passengers and property in State B, destined
for State A;
(5) Fifth Freedom:
Freedom of State A's airline to pick up passengers and property, on a reasonably
through route, from State A to State B, destined for States C or D, and to dis-
charge citizens and property from State C or D in States A or B.
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air commerce upon which agreement was sought. The failure of the United
States and Great Britain to agree upon three of these five points led to
the Bermuda Air Conference of 1946.1'
IATA was conceived at Chicago, nurtured at Havana,"s born at Mon-
treal,"G and emancipated at Bermuda. It was at Bermuda that IATA re-
ceived the rate-making authority which it continues to exercise today.'
III. IATA AS A MECHANISM
IATA is a membership association of the world's major commercial air
carriers." Membership is open to all airlines that have been authorized by
their respective governments to operate international services, and which
in fact operate such services." The authority of the Association is vested
in the General Meeting, which elects an Executive Committee to exercise
management and policy functions." This Committee, in turn, selects the
Director General, who with his Secretariat, makes the wheels of IATA
turn. The Secretariat performs services for the Association's five standing
committees,' the IATA Clearing House,2 and the IATA Traffic Con-
ferences."
The traffic conference technique was established at the First General
Meeting of the Association at Montreal in December 1945. At that time,
"4 For a detailed analysis of factors leading up to the Bermuda Conference, see Jones, supra note
7, at 230; see Cooper, Air Transport and World Organization, 55 YALE L.J. 1191 (1946); See
generally, Waldo, Sequels to the Chicago Aviation Conference, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 609
(1946).
"The Articles which the airline committee drew in Chicago, were adopted at an April 1945
meeting of international air operators at Havana, Cuba. Antitrust Hearings at 1072.
"6IATA is incorporated in Canada by a Special Act of Parliament, 9-10 George 6, c. 51,
(Royal Assent 18 Dec. 1945).
1 Agreement with the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services, concluded 11 Feb. 1946, 60
Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507 [hereinafter cited as the Bermuda Agreement]; the ratemaking ma-
chinery provisions are set forth in Annex 1I of the Bermuda Agreement.
"For a current membership list, see Official Airline Guide, June 1965, pp. AS-A10.
" Antitrust Hearings 1073.
'0 Ibid.





(5) Traffic Advisory Committee and the Facilitation Advisory Group.
See Antitrust Hearings 1073-74; See also Mankiewicz (ed.), 1956 ANNUAIRE FRANCAISE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 670 (1957).
"a The IATA Clearing House is located in London, but has so close a working relationship with
the Airlines Clearing House, Inc. in New York, that they are viewed analytically as a single unit.
See Quinn-Harkin, IATA, Financial Times of London, 2 Sept. 1957. The Clearinghouses function
to settle interline accounts among the carriers. I.e., A desires to fly from New York to London, via
Bermuda, and wishes to fly Eastern Airlines to Bermuda and BOAC from Bermuda to London;
Eastern will write the through ticket to London and collect the full fare, as it is the "originating
carrier." The Clearinghouse will debit and credit each carrier with its appropriate portion of A's
fare; no account need be settled as to any single transaction. Debtor members receive a monthly
statement upon which they must make telegraphic settlement of sterling to London or dollars to
New York within seven days. Monthly clearances are frequently settled by set-off; In twenty-nine
instances the set-off ratio has exceeded ninety-nine per cent. ALEXANDROWICZ, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 155; See also International Review, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 312 (1960); Antitrust Hearings 1075.
'The Traffic Conference machinery is the rate determining mechanism approved in the Bermuda
Agreement; See note 17 supra. It has subsequently been included in the majority of the fifty bi-
lateral agreements to which the United States is currently a party. 1964 CAB ANN. REP. 36.
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a resolution was adopted" which established three semi-autonomous re-
gional traffic conferences and provided a detailed procedure for their
operation." The government of each carrier member has approved this
resolution." The traffic conferences are established on a regional or geo-
graphic basis as follows:"7
(1) Traffic Conference No. One-The Western Hemisphere.
(2) Traffic Conference No. Two-Europe, Africa, and that part of the
Middle East lying west of and including Iran, Iceland, and the Azores.
(3) Traffic Conference No. Three-Asia, the balance of the Middle East,
Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Isles except Hawaii.
Each IATA member is a member of each Conference in which it operates
a service.
The Traffic Conferences perform two important functions:
(1) The setting of international airline rates for passenger and cargo
services;
(2) The standardization of the vast number of details involved in in-
terline facilitation.8
Although the first function is subject to far greater publicity, the latter
is of at least equal importance. Standardization techniques have made
interline commercial flight possible. They have removed the barriers of
language and currency from international air travel. As the result of one
standardization agreement, it is possible to travel around the world on the
services of in excess of 119 individual airlines on a single standard ticket
form."
What is good for the passenger, however, has proved equally enticing
to the airlines. The airlines have not refrained from utilizing the stand-
ardization technique for their own purposes. Thus, the carriers have often
made use of the miniature print of the Uniform Conditions of Carriage"
(found on the reverse side of the Standard International Airline Ticket)
for limitation3 or eliminationa" of carrier liability in cases of injury or
death resulting from carrier negligence.
IV. THE TRAFFIC CONFERENCE: A "PARA-LEGISLATIVE BODY"
The primary function of each traffic conference is to establish rates for
'Resolution as to the Provisions for the Regulation and Conduct of the Traffic Conferences
was drafted and adopted pursuant to Article VIII, para. 5, of the IATA Articles of Association;
See Sheehan, The IATA Traffic Conferences, 7 Sw. L.J. 135, 139 (1953); Antitrust Hearings
1073-74. See also Bebchick, The International Air Transport Association and the Civil Aeronautics
Board, 25 J. AiR L. & CoM. 8 (1958).
21 Ibid.
" For details of United States approval, see note 38, infra.
2 Antitrust Hearings 1076.
" "Crisis in the Conferences," Address by S. Ralph Cohen to the Centro per lo Sviluppo dei
Transporti Aerei, Rome, 29 April 1960, reprinted in 27 J. AIa L. & COM. 150 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Rome Address].
29 The Interline Traffic Agreement has been accepted by sixty-nine IATA members and by
fifty non-IATA members. See Antitrust Hearings 1078.
0 Uniform Conditions of Carriage is a project of IATA's Legal Committee. Antitrust Hearings
1074. The Uniform Conditions of Carriage are reprinted at 21 J. AsR L. & COM. 340 (1954).
a3 IATA Traffic Conference Resolutions, 10 C.A.B. 783 (1949).
2 See Antitrust Hearings 1060-62.
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its geographic region. Each carrier receives at least thirty days' notice of
a forthcoming meeting. This notice is accompanied by a fixed agenda
which outlines the matters to be dealt with at the meeting. Every member
of the Conference is entitled to have matters placed on the agenda. Since
unanimous consent of all members is required for the adoption of each
resolution, negotiation and compromise are the working tools of every
traffic conference meeting."
Each traffic conference has three standing committees, comprised of
personnel from each Conference member. Each Conference has a Secretary
who is a full-time working executive in the employ of the Conference and
with whom the committee chairmen coordinate inter-Conference meetings
of their respective committees. These meetings may be set at New York,
Paris, or Singapore (the regional headquarters of the several Conferences),
or at other agreed upon locations.' Each Conference has three standing
committees: "
(1) Analysis of Costs (Costs);
(2) Fees, Rates, Charges, and Schedules (FRCS) ; and
(3) Agency.
The Costs and FRCS Committees exist to coordinate the collection of data
required for the next meeting of the traffic conference. Their authority
is limited to making recommendations in their respective fields of opera-
tion . ' To the contrary, the Agency Committee of each Conference is a
strong economic force in the business of international aviation." The
Agency Committees meet bi-annually to consider and act upon:"
(1) Applications for travel agency appointment,
(2) Suspension or cancellation of the appointments of agents found to
be violating the terms of their agency sales contracts, and
(3) Revisions of local criteria for agency appointments.
Since each Conference's Agency Committee acts with respect to all of the
nations within its geographic region, it generally requires the help of an
Agency Investigation Board (AIB) in each country. The AIB, which ad-
vises the Committee of its views concerning the eligibility for appoint-
ment of new applicants, was created to localize the appointment procedure
3 Antitrust Hearings 1076-77; See Sheehan, supra note 24, at 139.
34Id. at 141.
a' Ibid; Antitrust Hearings 1077.
30 Ibid.
a1 Sheehan, supra note 24, at 176. See also Mankiewicz (ed.), 1956 ANNUAIRE FRANCAISE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 671; See generally (as to operation of IATA Traffic Conferences and their
Committees), 1957 Annual Report of ICAO (Montreal, 1958).
a A travel agent is a commission salesman who cannot earn a living at that business without
an agency agreement from one or more airlines. IATA, by resolution, has forbidden any member
from appointing or commissioning any travel agent who is not on the "IATA Approved List of
Agents." In so doing, they have created a licensing, or appointment, procedure, operated by each
Conference's licensing board-its Agency Committee. Sheehan, supra note 24, at 176; Antitrust
Hearings 1055-57. See IATA Agency Resolutions Hearing, 12 C.A.B. 493 (1951). See also McManus
v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961). This position is well
stated in Antitrust Hearings 1308 (testimony of James P. McManus). See also Apgar Travel Agency
v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Brief for the Dep't of
Justice, IATA Agency Resolutions Proceedings, CAB Docket No. 3350, submitted 22 Sept. 1950;
IATA Resolutions No. 810, 810a, 810b, 81od, 810e, and 812. But see Antitrust Hearings 2284-2300
(testimony of Thomas J. Donovan).
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by placing it in the hands of knowledgeable nationals of the applicant's
own country. While this concept may be valid when applied to Monaco,
its validity is questionable when directed at the United States or Brazil. 9
Prior to 1952, every member of IATA was required to execute a separate
agency agreement with every agent that represented it. Under this pro-
cedure, a single agent could end up with fifty or more separate agency
contracts. The carriers found this system burdensome and inefficient. In
order to remedy this situation, the Conferences met in Buenos Aires in May
1952 to adopt the Standard Form Agency Agreement and a new pro-
cedure for carrier appointment of agents.0 Under the method adopted,
each agent accepted by the Agency Committee for listing is sent two copies
of the standard form in blank. The agent signs and returns one copy to
the Conference Secretary and retains the other for his files. The Conference
then informs its members of the agent's availability for appointment.
Those carriers wishing to appoint the agent send him a Certificate of
Appointment. " That this procedure is manifestly pregnant with legal
problems was obvious to the Legal Committee, who were most restrained
in their support for a document they had created. ' Mr. Sheehan, then
IATA's Legal Drafting Officer, pointed out the following factors con-
cerning the Standard Agreement which remain potential legal problems:
(1) Is forwarding a blank form of agreement to an agent an offer,
subject to a condition precedent that a member forward an appointing
certificate to that agent? or
(2) Is it merely an inquiry, which the agent may adopt as his offer to
the carrier and which the carrier may accept by forwarding the appoint-
ment certificate to the agent? IATA clearly favors the second rationale,
as it makes the member's headquarters the applicable situs under the situs
or lex loci contractus theory.
(3) Since the Conference forwards the blank agreement to the agent
and retains the inscribed contract for its members, what, if any, validity
will be given to the Conference Resolutions and the member's power of
attorney to the Agency Committee of the Conference, which provide
that neither IATA, the Conference, the Committee, nor the employees of
any of them, shall be personally liable for acts committed on behalf of its
members?
(4) What effect will various judicial tribunals give to the terms of the
agreement, to its form, and to its method and mode of execution?
To date, the agreement remains unblemished.'
V. IATA AND THE GOVERNMENTS
International air commerce is a source of national pride, power, and
" Sheehan, supra note 24, at 176; Antitrust Hearings 1079.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid; For an example of the systems operations, see Antitrust Hearings 2382-89.
4 Sheehan, sutrra note 24, at 178.
' Including the United States. See McManus v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 928 (1961).
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prestige."M As such, international airlines have become favorite tools of
national image makers throughout the world. The profit motive is fre-
quently secondary, if indeed in some circumstances it is considered at all. '
Since the vast majority of international airlines are owned by their respec-
tive national governments in one form or another,' 6 and are almost without
exception the "chosen instruments" of each government, it is not sur-
prising that these same governments are frequently disturbed by what
they consider to be both the philosophic and pragmatic immaturity of the
United States in the sphere of international aviation policy." Given this
frame of reference, it is somewhat less difficult to comprehend the inability
of the Chicago Conference of 1944 to arrive at a reasonable compromise
between the plans presented, 9 and the subsequent birth at Bermuda of
so strange a creature as is IATA.
It is quite possible that IATA would never have come to fruition had
Congress given the CAB the same ratemaking authority over foreign air
commerce as it did over domestic air commerce." Notwithstanding the
express manifestation of congressional intent to the contrary, it is clear
that one of the prime objectives of the CAB at the Bermuda Conference
was to obtain a greater measure of control over ratemaking in interna-
tional aviation.' Although the Bermuda Agreement, like all of the subse-
quent bilateral executive agreements concerning the exchange of civil
aviation operating privileges, was negotiated by the State Department, the
CAB provided technical assistance and counsel to the United States diplo-
matic team of negotiators; they were present and vocal throughout the
meeting." In fact, the record clearly reflects that the Chairman of the CAB
was personally present at the negotiating table almost constantly through-
"CAB, The Role of Competition in Commercial Air Transportation, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952)
(a Report to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business), pt.
V, "International and Territorial Services," passim. See Cooper, supra note 14; THOMAS, ECONOMIC
REGULATION OF SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORT 188-89 (1951). See also Logic of the Air, Fortune,
April 1943, p. 72. But cf. Address of Hon. Welch Pogue, Former Chairman of the CAB, before the
National Aeronautics Association at Minneapolis, Minn., as quoted in Burke, Influences Affecting
International Aviation Policy, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 602 (1946).
"' International air carriers, such as Thai International Airlines and Ethiopian International Air-
lines, do much for their country's national pride but little for its national economy; they fre-
quently draw upon needed hard currency reserves.
"Antitrust Hearings 1047, 2449.
"
7 See FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 273 (5th ed. 1961). See also LISSITZYN,
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AND NATIONAL POLICY 137-99 (1942).
4' The carryover of United States domestic economic and legal principles, such as the inherent
good of the "free enterprise system" and the reflection of that philosophy in our antitrust laws, are
quite unacceptable to Euro-Afro-Asian governments. See Jones, supra note 7, at 224-25.
"' Although prior to World War II Britain had generally been quite liberal, particularly as to
her long-haul cabotage routes to the Commonwealth, in contrast to the restrictive concepts of the
continental States, the British adopted a restrictive policy at Chicago. Hesse, Some Questions on
Aviation Cabotage, I McGILL L.J. 129 (1952); See Economics of Air Transportation in Europe,
League of Nations Pub. No. C. 97, M. 44, 135 VIII (1935); Jones, supra note 7, at 228.
"0 Compare the authority delegated in each area at § 1102(d) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964), (which is identical with the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, as to their economic regulatory provisions), which gives the Civil
Aeronautics Board the power to fix rates for domestic air commerce, but only the authority to fix
maximum and/or minimum rates for overseas air commerce by United States flag carriers; See Hale
and Hale, Competition or Control IV: Air Carriers, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 311 (1961).
" See van der Tuuk Adriani, The "Bermuda" Capacity Clauses, 22 J. AIR L. & COM. 406 (1955).
"
2 Antitrust Hearings 2453; 1964 CAB ANN. REP. 36.
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out the meeting. "3 This influence was remarkably documented in the text
of the agreement, wherein it provides for alternative ratemaking procedures
should Congress see fit to grant the CAB the authority it sought over
international ratemaking;" it continues to seek identical authority twenty
years later."
Given the limited direct legislative authority it has in this area, the
CAB was somewhat pressed to come forth with a practical plan that
would give it a measure of control and authority.6 This it accomplished
by utilizing Sections 41217 and 414" of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938."' In combination, this provided a method by which the CAB could
require United States international air carriers to file any proposed fare,"0
which the CAB could then, in effect, approve or disapprove.' By giving
its blessing to IATA, of which the United States international carriers were
members, and by virtue of its ratemaking machinery, " the CAB was acting
to insure and perpetuate its own control over international air fares."
It would clearly have been a violation of United States antitrust legisla-
tion" for United States carriers, with or without combination with any
foreign carrier," to have met and agreed upon rates." Unless the CAB
executed its legislative authority to grant antitrust immunity" as to both
the meeting and the rates," the carriers would be obliged to submit all
rates to the CAB for its approval. To bring this point home, a requirement
was placed in the Bermuda Agrement that IATA rate agreements involv-
ing or affecting the United States or United States carriers be subject to
the approval of the CAB;" it has reappeared in all subsequent bilaterals
to which the United States is a party. Britain did not require the inclusion
of an approval clause upon her behalf in the Bermuda Agreement."0 It
was quite unnecessary for her to do so, as the Ministry had international
53 Antitrust Hearings 1028.
5 See authorities cited at note 17 supra.
5 1964 CAB ANN. REP. 69; See S. 1540 and H.R. 6400, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964).
56 The CAB so states in its reasons for approving the IATA machinery; See IATA Traffic Con-
ference Resolution, 6 C.A.B. 639, 642 (1946).
" Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 412, 52 Star. 1003 (now Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
5 412, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1964)).
"SCivil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 414, 52 Star. 1004 (now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5
414, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1964)).
59 Now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964). See note 50 supra.
0 Section 412 (a) requires that every carrier file any agreement with any other carrier, including
fare agreements.
61 Section 412(b) authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Board to approve agreements filed under §
412 (a) which are "not adverse to the public interest."
62 See note 56 supra.
65 IATA, WORLD AIR TRANSPORT BACKGROUND, Montreal, 17 May 1956.
64See Clayton Act § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
65 Section 412 (a) requires filing of any agreement by a United States carrier, whether with an-
other United States carrier or a foreign carrier, or both; an agreement to fix rates would fall within
the prohibitions of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 13
(1964).
" Ibid.
67 Section 414 of the act provides that persons affected by agreements approved by the Civil
Aeronautics Board under § 412(b) are "relieved from the operations of the 'antitrust laws.'"
68 Two potential antitrust violations exist: (1) meeting to fix prices, and (2) agreeing at such
a meeting upon the prices fixed. Both activities constitute violations of the Clayton Act.
6" See Bermuda Agreement, annex II, para. (b).
70 See International Review, 27 J. AiR L. & COM. 312 (1960).
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ratemaking authority," although it was not the so called "double punch""2
that was already enjoyed by most of the governments on the Continent.
Shortly thereafter, Britain joined the latter group upon its nationalization
of BOAC.'"
Almost twenty-one years after Bermuda, the United States regulatory
scheme seems quite quaint, if no longer odd, to other nations. Thus, an
IATA executive, in a recent speech to a meeting of aviation experts, was
brought to say:
[T]he peculiar attitude of United States law toward public utilities requires
that agreements between airlines ... must be subjected to the closest scrutiny
and must be specifically approved before they can become effective. Other
nations feel that they cannot exercise a lesser degree of sovereignty.' 4
VI. THE MECHANISM OF IATA
The modus operandi of the IATA Traffic Conferences is quite simple
upon its face. All of the members of all of the Conferences meet, in secret.'"
After the technicians of each carrier have swapped and bargained, certain
basic fare structures are proposed in the form of Conference Resolutions.
These are put to a vote before the assembled executive reprsentatives of
the members. Under the Conference voting scheme each carrier has one
vote,"' but that is all that is needed. Like the Security Council of the
United Nations, IATA has a veto system. A single nay and the Resolution
is defeated." While this may appear to be somewhat odd for an interna-
tional trade association, it seems even more so when examined in the light
of IATA's graduated dues structure" which is not unlike the United States
income tax. IATA has never asserted a claim to democratic principles of
organization." Considering the composition of the membership of the
Association, the veto method of voting is not entirely lacking in merit.
In essence, the members' governments have sent their technical experts to
a meeting to negotiate the price of a commodity. These men, in the employ
of their governments directly or indirectly, have been fully instructed
before their departure." This does not necessarily mean that they are
bound to any given rate for a particular route. Rather, they are most
1 Ibid.
72 Since the airlines are owned by the government, the government has two opportunities to
agree upon prospective international fares: (1) Initially, in their negotiation or origination stage, at
the IATA Traffic Conference meeting; and (2) subsequently, when the approved resolution is
submitted to the subject government for its approval. Since the carrier is merely the shadow of
the government, the latter is said to have a "double punch."
"Air Corporations Act of 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 91.
, Rome Address 152.
" The three traffic conferences meet together because many of the carriers operate in more than
one conference area. In addition, rates determined often have an inter-conference impact.
" See International Review, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 312 (1960).
" Ibid.
"1 Sheehan, supra note 24, at 143.
" Statement of Sir William Hildred, Director General of IATA, setting forth the merits of
the Association, Antitrust Hearings 1048-49.
" Testimony of Juan Trippe where he stated: "The British Government owns the entire com-
pany [BOAC], so that its policy is coordinated and directly tied in with government policy in
every regard." Antitrust Hearings 2455. (Mr. Trippe testified as the then President of IATA, as
well as President and Chairman of the Board of Pan American World Airways.)
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decidedly limited within a specific range of negotiability. After they have
negotiated, if the resulting resolution is beyond that operative range, they
may simply exercise the veto. In reality, this is a time-saving system, for
their government would be quite prone to do the same thing, were an
identical majority-approved tariff resolution presented to it for its ap-
proval; however, it might be less likely to disapprove such a resolution for
other reasons."s While the CAB, in its lobbying efforts before Congress for
an increase in its international fare-making authority, has taken the posi-
tion that government-owned carriers do not generally represent their
government's policies, IATA has developed a more straightforward posi-
tion in this regard. An Association executive has recently stated:
[E]ach of them [the members] must . . .negotiate within the framework
of what it knows its government wants, will permit, or may hopefully be
persuaded to allow."2
That the government airline members of IATA do in fact represent their
governments is quite clear from a cursory examination of the pertinent
facts. A number of the governments represented by national carriers (e.g.,
the Netherlands represented by KLM) accept the IATA fare structure
resolution as proposed without further investigation. " Other governments,
similarly situated, may make a pro forma examination of the tariffs filed,
but make a practice of accepting the IATA tariff."' It is only appropriate
that these governments should act in this manner, for they have already
consented to that which is proposed.
IATA has been called an exercise in "professional para-legislation."5
What governments have been unable or unwilling to agree upon directly,
they have quite frequently been able to agree upon through the machinery
of IATA. This is clearly an exercise in delegated national authority. It
would be quite simple for most nations to freely accept this rationale. It is
impossible for the United States to do so, for the CAB does not have any
international rate-making power to delegate. While the authority of the air
ministries of most nations to set international air fares is either inherent,
8
81 Some governments are said to fear the alleged chaos of an "open rate," although the experi-
ence has never proved to be chaotic. See Rome Address 154-55. But see Antitrust Hearings 2563
(statement of the CAB).
"
2 Rome Address 153.
83 Antitrust Hearings 1064.
84 Antitrust Hearings 2565-68 (statement of the CAB).
85Mankiewicz, supra note 37, at 671.
"eAs in Great Britain, where authority is derived from two sources: (1) as to BOAC, from S
5 of the Air Corporations Act of 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 91; (2) as to foreign carriers,
through inherent authority of the Aviation Ministry, Ministry of Aviation Order 1959 (S.I. 1959
No. 1768), arts. 2(1), (3). The Ministry does not acquire such authority directly as a result of
international agreements entered into by the Crown, as the same do not become applicable municipal
law unless so incorporated by domestic legislation. Cf. Republic of Italy v. Hambros Bank, Ltd.,
[1950] 1 All E.R. 430 (Ch.). But cf. Antitrust Hearings 2566 (supplementary statement of the
CAB). The nature of the inherent authority of the Ministry was fully described to this author in
an interview with the Hon. N .W. Walker, Civil Air Attache, Embassy of Great Britain, Washing-
ton, D.C., on 7 April 1965.
As in Brazil, where § 151 of the Constitution of the United States of Brazil establishes the
principle of "fair and just remuneration," upon which the executive has asserted its claim to in-
herent regulatory authority.
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express,s" or implied," the Congress of the United States has expressly limit-
ed the authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board in this regard." It seems
quite possible, that had there been legislative silence, the CAB might well
have asserted a claim to implied authority in this area.9" The continuing his-
torical position of the CAB, as a stepchild among its peers, has led it to
dramatic action with little in the way of concrete results. Concurrently, the
air carrier lobby has annually reiterated its seemingly logical but highly
over-simplified arguments in favor of retention of the status quo; they
have been successful.' In its efforts to retain some margin of control over
international air fares, the CAB has increasingly tended to cooperate with
IATA.9" There is a growing body of informed opinion that feels that the
CAB has grown so accomodating that it is becoming increasingly difficult
to tell the regulator from the regulatee; that it no longer carries forth its
legislative mandate to protect the public interest with sufficient vigor."'
VII. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RATEMAKING
Rapid changes in international air commerce are an accepted way of
life." In the past, these changes have been essentially technological" rather
than structural in nature.9" Henceforth, projected technical advances," com-
bined with previously unequaled per capita economic growth in the United
States, 8 should catalyze the commencement of needed structural changes
in international air commerce. Primary among these envisioned develop-
ments will be a revised approach to ratemaking, reflecting an increased
" As in France, where rates must be submitted for the approval of the Minister of Civil and
Commercial Aviation; CODE OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION (30 Nov. 1955), book III, ch.
III, tit. II, art. 129; based upon Decree No. 55-1590 of 30 Nov. 1955, which was codified pursuant
to Law No. 53-515 of 28 May 1958, [1958] Journal Officiel 4842 (Fr.) and [1955] Journal Ofliciel
11815 (Fr.). In addition, Air France must also submit its rates to the Minister of Finance & Eco-
nomic Affairs, pursuant to ch. I, tit. III, art. 142 of the Code, above. If either Ministry fails to act
within two months, the proposed rates are deemed approved.
As in West Germany, pursuant to Law of 21 Aug. 1936, Verondung Ulber Luftverkehr 42
(Ger.).
As in Japan, pursuant to Civil Aeronautics Law No. 23, 15 July 1962, §§ 105 and 129 (2);
Civil Aeronautics Regulations (Japan), arts. 217 and 233 (21), prescribing the contents of ap-
plications for rate approval.
As in the Netherlands, Aviation Act of 30 July 1926, art. 11.
" As in Argentina, pursuant to AVIATION CODE OF ARGENTINA, 15 July 1954, (promulgated
4 Aug. 1954), Law No. 14,307, tit. VIII, ch. I, art. 98, [1954] Boletin Oficial. See also LOJOUANE
EDITORES, CODIGo AERONAUTICO DE LA NACION ARGENTINA (1954), for relation of the Code,
above, to other Argentine law concerning aviation.
"9Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(d), 72 Stat. 788, 49 U.S.C. § 1482 (1964).
90 See Antitrust Hearings 2560-65 (supplementary statement of the CAB).
91 Air Travel, Sept. 1962, p. 56.
92Justice Demands Curbs on IATA, The Travel Agent, 10 May 1965, p. 1.
93 Ibid. See Antitrust Hearings 2356 (Testimony of R. W. Joyce). See also, Parish, A Personal
View, American Aviation, Feb. 1964, p. 33, discussing CAB Chairman Boyd's efforts on behalf of
IATA, in forcing El Al, Irish Int'l, and Canadian Pacific Airlines to come to terms on a proposed
rate resolution upon which they had been holding out; Interview with Dr. Walter Berchtold, Presi-
dent of Swissair, American Aviation, Feb. 1964, p. 34.
" See generally FREDERICK, Op. cit. supra, note 46, at ch. 10.
9' In twenty years, international airlines have evolved from the DC4 to the fan-jet engine of
the latest intercontinental versions of the B707 and the DC8; See, Henzey, Airlines In Midst of
Largest Equipment Program, American Aviation, May 1965, p. 16.
" The operative structure of the IATA Traffic Conference has remained virtually unchanged
during the past 19 years. See Antitrust Hearings 1076.
" Within the next ten years, commercial airlines will be operating between 150 and 200 super-
sonic aircraft, at a gross equipment cost of from between $5 billion and $8 billion. Henzey, supra
note 95.
98 It is estimated that by 1972, average annual per family income in the United States will be
$9,500. How U.S. is to Change, U.S. News & World Report, 17 May 1965, p. 56.
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voice of the passenger." How will IATA fare in the midst of these changes?
It seems clear that IATA, as an institution, will continue and will grow"'
but not without basic changes in its methods of operation."1 IATA execu-
tives have propagandized to the effect that the Association is a necessary
evil." 2 The framework extended by them in support of these allegations,
however, belie their contentions. All argument to this end commences from
a single premise that price competition in international air commerce
does not constitute an available alternative.' 3 While the majority of in-
formed opinion shares this view,'-° a candid examination of the price re-
ductions resultant from IATA v. non-IATA carrier competition over the
same routes causes one to question the type of information upon which
such opinions are based. A significant minority continues to support a
mixed approach of regulated and competitive rates as a healthier approach
which is more conducive to carrier cogitation than total regulation.'
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo the validity of the majority position
above, there remain several reasonable alternatives to IATA. Essentially,
each of these alternatives involves intergovernmental negotiation on either
a bilateral or a multilateral basis.0" While this method of approach is
operatively practical, it is politically infeasible. The inescapable result of
direct government action was demonstrated at the Honolulu meeting of
the IATA in the fall of 1958.07 Midway through that meeting, the air
minister of one State, in addressing his national parliament, stated that
either a particular proposed resolution then pending before the meeting be
approved, or his government would order its national carrier to withdraw
from the Association. 10  This attempt at unilateral policy determination
boomeranged;'" the minister involved was forced into eventual resignation.
The instant effect of the statement at the IATA meeting was to make re-
wording, revision, or "backdooring" of the proposed resolution impossible.
Since most international fares are closely related with each other, negotia-
tion bogged down, and IATA's ratemaking machinery ground to a halt.
The Traffic Conference ended without adopting a fare resolution. A single
public statement had caused the meeting to end in a stalemate."0 The
"9 The United States has long provided a far larger number of airline passengers than any other
country in the world. In fiscal 1964, this number increased to an estimated total of 6.6 million
persons, for an increase of 10.1% over fiscal 1963. See generally 1964 CAB ANN. REP. 35. Con-
sider the statement of IATA's Director General-designate, Knut Hammarskjold, that: "[I] will
represent the passenger . . . for the passenger is the ultimate aim of the carriers." Parrish, New
Look for IATA: A Cultured Swede, American Aviation, May 1965, pp. 18-19.
100 There are few practical alternatives to IATA, but many practical changes that can be made
within IATA. Consider the statement of Chairman Celler of the House Judiciary Committee: "[I]
can readily see why an organization like [IATA] .. . is quite essential. However, it is not perfect."
Antitrust Hearings 1071.
1o1 See Parrish, New Look for IATA: A Cultured Swede, American Aviation, May 1965, pp.
18-19.
.01 Rome Address.
'"Antitrust Hearings 1052 (testimony of Sir William Hildred, Director General of IATA).
" See generally authorities cited at notes 44 & 47 supra.
'o' Ibid.
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resulting crisis was resolved when a new minister, not bound by his pre-
decessor's pledge, assumed office.' This incident established the validity
of two important concepts:
(1) that a publicly proclaimed inflexible position by one party, as to a
single proposed resolution, can totally wreck a traffic conference meeting,
not only as to the resolution in question but as to every other item on the
agenda as well;
(2) that the lack of an agreement at the end of a given traffic confer-
ence meeting does not necessarily produce the havoc and industrial anarchy
that some had predicated would result from such a situation."'
The inability of the traffic conference to agree upon a new rate structure
results in a so called "open rate" period. In this instance, the "open rate"
extended over a period of some six months. In contrast to the dire pre-
dictions which were made during the Conference meeting, the "open
rate" went unnoticed by the public at large. The blood and fire of mani-
fold air crashes, resulting from over-economies necessitated by cut-throat
rate wars, never came to pass. Instead, everything remained as it had been
prior to the meeting. During the open rate all carriers refrained from
filing new or revised rate tariffs. In practical effect, they acted as if they
were bound by the expired IATA rate resolution. Had the carriers met in
an attempt to arrive at a new set of rates outside the IATA framework
and without the prior approval of the CAB, the meeting would have con-
stituted an obvious violation of United States antitrust laws.11 As a result,
it has been contended that the aftermath of this incident was unique, and
that it therefore proves nothing. While it certainly does not provide a long
term alternative to IATA, it does establish that short term gaps between
rate tariffs will be met by carrier apathy, rather than competitive anarchy.
It is frequently suggested that international air fares be determined
directly by intergovernmental negotiation." ' There is very little merit to
the proposal, for its success requires two difficult prerequisites:115
(1) absolute secrecy before, during, and after the commencement of
negotiations; and
(2) an honest desire to arrive at a viable commercial agreement with-
out regard to national pride or political implications.
The problems inherent in producing these precedent conditions obviate
the impracticality of the proposal.
"I Ibid.
... See Hearings On Civil Air Policy, Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce 498, 84th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1956).
" See authority cited at note 64 supra. However, the CAB would be required to convince the
Department of Justice as to the necessity of prosecution. If the CAB were successful, Justice would
have to establish that the meeting and resulting rates constituted a conspiracy, rather than a trade
conference resulting in independent parallel action normal in the airline industry. See Milgram v.
Loews, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952).
114 See Jones, supra note 7.
... See generally authorities cited at note 14 supra.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Do the accomplishments of IATA justify its privileged status under
United States antitrust laws? Many think that they do not. What, then,
is the alternative to IATA? One realistic answer would clearly seem to be
a restructured IATA. Most of the institution's harshest critics would be
softened, if not silenced, if one or more of the following suggested reforms
were adopted.
(1) In those instances in which a sovereign State has authorized more
than one carrier to engage in international air commerce, such carriers
shall meet with their government prior to any meeting of IATA and shall
adopt a uniform position upon each proposed agenda item. Such uniform
position shall be represented at the IATA meeting by a single joint repre-
sentative of those carriers who shall not be in the direct employ of any
of these carriers nor of their government."1 '
(2) Traffic conferences shall be held on an annual basis. Six months
prior to the commencement of such annual conference, each national
carrier or their joint national representative, as the case may be, shall serve
upon each other any changes which they intend to propose at the forth-
coming session together with appropriate supporting documents. Three
months prior to the commencement of such annual session, each party upon
whom such service was made shall offer a reply, wherein they shall indi-
cate generally their position upon the proposed change together with appro-
priate supporting documents.
(3) An international management corps shall be established to provide
long term continuity to the programs of the Association.
(4) Meetings generally shall be open to the public, but executive ses-
sions may be held where secrecy is required by the nature of the agenda
item under consideration.
(5) Each member of IATA freely acknowledges that it enjoys a unique
privilege as an international air carrier. It fully agrees that regardless of
its particular form of business organization it is ultimately responsible to
the public at large. It expressly recalls and reaffirms the basic principles of
IATA as stated in its Articles of Association: to promote safe, regular,
and economic air transportation.
0 In the United States, this representation should be conducted by an independent, quasi-
governmental negotiating team, which while directly representing the carriers is indirectly repre-
senting the ultimate consumer. Clearly, this representation should not be directly related, in the
public sense, with the government or any agency thereof. To the contrary, it should bear immediate
relation to the several carriers involved. In essence, it need only represent the government, and the
public, to the extent that the carrier representatives of BOAC, Air France, etc., act upon behalf of
their governments.
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